\u3cem\u3eKiobel\u3c/em\u3e: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction by Colangelo, Anthony J.
Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 28 | Issue 1 Article 5
Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction
Anthony J. Colangelo
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the Conflicts of Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction
Commons
This Articles & Essays is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland
Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 Md. J. Int'l L. 65 (2013).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol28/iss1/5
4-Colangelo 8/28/2013 9:23 PM 
ESSAY 
65 
Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between 
Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction 
 
ANTHONY J. COLANGELO
†
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This brief symposium Essay addresses whether and in what ways 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
1
 constitutes an exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction by the United States to regulate conduct or an exercise of 
adjudicative jurisdiction by U.S. courts to entertain suit, as well as the 
implications of that classification. The Essay begins with a central 
and hotly contested focal point in ATS suits—most prominently, in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
2
 recently decided by the 
Supreme Court. Namely: how to conceptualize the applicable law in 
ATS suits and, more specifically, whether courts apply international 
law directly or some form of U.S. common law that may or may not 
reflect international norms. The Essay explains that the Court in 
Kiobel basically answered this question correctly by finding that 
international law supplies the applicable conduct-regulating rule 
under the statute; and therefore, the ATS does not constitute an 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.  
But, the Essay argues, the Court then misguidedly applied a 
novel presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS. As the Essay 
contends, the Court couldn‘t apply the presumption to the conduct-
regulating rule authorized by the statute since, as noted, that rule 
comes from international law, which applies everywhere. Because the 
conduct-regulating rule comes from international, not national, law 
there is no uniquely U.S. law to which the presumption could apply. 
International law, on the other hand, prescribes conduct-regulating 
 
† Associate Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. I thank the Maryland Journal of 
International Law for inviting me to participate in its symposium and for the comments I 
received there.  
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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rules the world over and thus its application is never really extra-
territorial since it covers the globe, particularly with respect to 
universal jurisdiction violations.     
Unable to apply a presumption against extraterritoriality to the 
conduct-regulating rule under the ATS, the Court in Kiobel seized 
upon the cause of action authorized by the ATS as the relevant 
creature of U.S. law to which the presumption applied. This move 
was not only novel, but also problematic. The presumption has 
traditionally applied only to exercises of U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe 
conduct-regulating rules over persons or things abroad. Jurisdictional 
statutes are not, as the Kiobel Court itself noted, conduct-regulating 
rules;
3
 instead, they go to a court‘s jurisdiction to entertain suit. As 
such, these statutes relate principally to adjudicative, not prescriptive, 
jurisdiction. A presumption against extraterritoriality has not 
traditionally applied to these statutes because, simply put, they aren‘t 
extraterritorial—and, crucially, this is so even when the activity 
underlying the claims authorized by the statute take place abroad.  
To be sure, the Supreme Court recently went out of its way to 
make precisely this point in another case involving the presumption 
against extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.
4—the very case on which Kiobel overwhelmingly relies for both 
its reasoning and its result. Yet Kiobel directly contradicts Morrison‘s 
explicit finding of district court jurisdiction in that case over claims 
involving activity abroad.
5
 Morrison explained that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality—as a canon that regulates prescriptive 
conduct-regulating rules—did not operate upon the jurisdictional 
statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
6
 Like § 78aa, and as the Kiobel Court 
openly acknowledged, the ATS is also a ―strictly jurisdictional‖ 
statute.
7
 If the ATS does not contain sufficient indicia of 
extraterritorial application, certainly neither does § 78aa, which 
simply provides: ―The district courts of the United States . . . shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the 
rules and regulations thereunder . . . .‖8 In sum, Kiobel‘s extension of 
 
3. Id. at 1664. 
4. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77. 
7. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.  
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006). 
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a presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS is not only 
conceptually misguided and doctrinally unsound, it also contradicts 
the Court‘s own most recent pronouncements about the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Kiobel may now be the law, but with it the 
Court has rendered that law contradictory and, thus, incoherent.     
I. THE ADJUDICATIVE VERSUS PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION 
DISPUTE 
The question whether the ATS authorizes application of 
international law directly or international law reflected in some form 
of common law was always a red herring. It basically 
misapprehended what it purported to answer—namely, the questions 
for reargument in Kiobel: ―Whether and under what circumstances 
the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations 
of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign 
other than the United States.‖9 The answers to these questions did not 
depend on whether the applicable law in ATS suits was 
conceptualized as the direct application of international law or U.S. 
common law that reflects international law. Rather, the crucial 
question for whether ATS claims arising in foreign territory were 
actionable under traditional canons of statutory construction was 
whether the conduct-regulating rule of decision in ATS suits—
however it is conceptualized—accurately reflects extant rules of 
international law, including as to the scope of liability. 
The ―law of nations,‖ or what the Supreme Court considers to be 
modern-day international law for ATS purposes,
10
 prohibits certain 
universal jurisdiction violations everywhere. These violations include 
serious human rights abuses like torture and genocide, certain acts of 
terrorism, and other universally condemned offenses like piracy.
11
 
The international law prohibiting these offenses does not care how it 
is implemented in any given domestic legal system; for example, it 
could be applied directly by courts or via statutory or common-law 
incorporation.
12
 When U.S. courts apply the substance of 
 
9. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).  
10. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (―[F]ederal courts should not 
recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law 
norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical 
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.‖). 
11. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. 
INT‘L L. 149 app. (2006) (detailing the current universal jurisdiction offenses under 
international law). 
12. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31–33 (5th ed. 1998).  
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international law imposing liability for universal jurisdiction 
violations—however that international law is conceptualized within 
the U.S. domestic legal system—U.S. courts are effectively applying 
an international law that covers the globe. In turn, the exercise of 
jurisdiction does not involve the projection of uniquely national law 
abroad, but rather the decentralized enforcement of an international 
law that already applied to the conduct where and when it occurred. 
Thus, if the conduct-regulating rule courts apply in ATS cases 
accurately reflects extant international law governing the activity in 
question, including as to liability, there is no exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States.        
It is important to appreciate the perceived doctrinal and litigation 
stakes of the adjudicative versus prescriptive jurisdiction dispute for 
Kiobel—a suit by foreigners, against foreigners, alleging wrongful 
conduct abroad, or what some now call a ―foreign-cubed‖ suit.13 
Petitioners wanted the law applied in ATS suits to be conceptualized 
as international law so they could claim that all the ATS does is 
authorize what‘s called ―adjudicative jurisdiction‖ for U.S. courts 
sitting in U.S. territory.
14
 Respondents, on the other hand, wanted the 
law to be conceptualized as U.S. common law so that the ATS 
constitutes an exercise of what‘s called ―prescriptive jurisdiction‖ by 
the United States inside foreign territory.
15
 For those unfamiliar with 
these terms, ―adjudicative jurisdiction‖ is generally regarded as the 
authority of courts to entertain suits, while ―prescriptive jurisdiction‖ 
is the authority to make and apply law to persons or things.
16
 
The importance of this conceptual distinction should start to 
become apparent: if the applicable law is international law, the ATS 
can be said to create only adjudicative jurisdiction for U.S. courts to 
entertain suits involving foreign elements and simply doesn‘t involve 
 
13. See, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 9, 37, 38, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (referring to Kiobel as a ―foreign-
cubed‖ case). The term has been used for some time in the securities litigation context and 
has more recently migrated to the international law area. However, ―foreign-cubed‖ suits 
have been around in international law at least as long as universal jurisdiction, which was 
well-established at the time of the founding. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820). 
14. See Petitioners‘ Supplemental Opening Brief at 39–40, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 
10-1491). 
15. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 47–48. 
16. For a recent explication of these types of jurisdiction, see Anthony J. Colangelo, 
Spatial Legality, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2012).  
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extraterritorial application of U.S. national conduct-regulating rules 
(or prescriptive jurisdiction). What courts do under the ATS is thus 
directly analogous to—indeed it is conceivably the same as—what 
U.S. courts do when they apply the foreign conduct-regulating rules 
of, say, the place where a harm occurred, which U.S. courts have 
been doing since the founding, including in so-called ―foreign-cubed‖ 
cases. In fact, there‘s an entire course in law school devoted largely 
to the subject, called Conflict of Laws. 
On the other hand, if the applicable law under the ATS is some 
variety of U.S. common law, then the United States may be engaged 
in the extraterritorial application of its conduct-regulating rules to 
persons or things abroad—i.e., prescriptive jurisdiction. And if that‘s 
right, then the longstanding
17
 and recently reinvigorated
18
 
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. national law 
kicks in to block the projection of the conduct-regulating rule, along 
with the presumption‘s motivating rationales like avoiding clashes 
between overlapping U.S. and foreign conduct-regulating laws.
19
 In 
addition, the separate Charming Betsy canon of construction 
requiring that ambiguous statutes be construed not to violate 
international law would constrain the reach of U.S. law
20
 since it 
would likely violate international law to extend purely U.S. laws 
inside foreign territory to regulate conduct with no U.S. connection.
21
 
II. WHY THE CATEGORIZATION DOES NOT REALLY MATTER  
In my view, the heuristic value of the ―adjudicative‖ and 
―prescriptive‖ jurisdiction categories has basically run out in this 
context. As far as conduct-regulating rules go, it doesn‘t really matter 
on the extraterritorial jurisdiction question how we conceptualize the 
 
17. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631 (1818) (holding that the 
application of the Piracy Act of 1790 is confined ―to any person or persons owing permanent 
or temporary allegiance to the United States,‖ not to foreigners). 
18. See Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).  
19. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (explaining that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality ―serves to protect against unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord‖). 
20. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (―[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .‖); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de 
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (relying on Charming Betsy in order to hold that the 
National Labor Relations Board did not have proper jurisdiction because Congress must 
affirmatively express an intention to apply U.S. law extraterritorially in order for such law to 
apply).  
21. See Colangelo, supra note 11, at 150.  
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law courts apply in ATS suits—whether it is international law or 
some form of U.S. common law reflecting international law. The key 
question, instead, is whether that law, however it is conceptualized, 
indeed accurately reflects extant rules of international law, including 
as to liability.  
(Before explaining why, a brief aside on how this last 
requirement that international law provides for liability also can 
guide whether to recognize a private right of action under the 
statute—something respondents and their amici have seized upon as a 
limitation in ATS suits.
22
 In short, if international law provides for 
individual liability, there is a private right of action. The Supreme 
Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
23
 repeatedly explained that an ATS 
cause of action lies not for any international law violation, but instead 
only ―for the modest number of international law violations with a 
potential for personal liability‖24—that is, ―rules binding individuals 
for the benefit of other individuals . . . [under] the law of nations, 
admitting of a judicial remedy.‖25 And there is no doubt that ―the 
current state of international law‖26 imposes personal liability for 
some (limited) violations, but not for most others.) 
Now to why it doesn‘t matter whether the ATS is conceptualized 
as authorizing the application of international law directly or 
international law incorporated into common law when it comes to the 
conduct-regulating rule of decision. As noted above, international law 
itself doesn‘t care about how it is conceptualized or implemented 
within any given domestic legal system, so Charming Betsy is silent 
on this question. Depending on the country, some national justice 
systems may require implementing legislation to apply international 
law as a domestic rule of decision, others may not; but that‘s a matter 
for a nation‘s internal law, not international law. Of course, if states 
pretend to implement international law and don‘t, or exaggerate it, 
that‘s a problem—including for the ATS. Applying idiosyncratic or 
extravagant domestic definitions of international law would 
 
22. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents, supra note 13, at 15–16, 42; Supplemental 
Brief of Amici Curiae BP America et al. in Support of Respondents at 14–15, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
23. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
24. Id. at 724.  
25. Id. at 715.  
26. Id. at 733  
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constitute extraterritorial application of domestic law abroad if the 
cause of action arises in foreign territory. 
Next, and perhaps more importantly for ATS purposes, if 
international law is implemented accurately into U.S. domestic law 
such translation to domestic law does not somehow strip that 
international law of its universal jurisdiction powers to apply the 
world over. To be absolutely clear, this is so regardless of how 
international law is implemented in U.S. law, it could be 
implemented by statute or through the common law. Either way, the 
United States is applying a substantive international law that governs 
everywhere. 
In turn, when U.S. courts apply substantive international law 
proscribing universal jurisdiction violations—however that law came 
to be the applicable rule of decision in U.S. courts—the United States 
is not projecting uniquely national law abroad, but acts as a 
decentralized enforcer of an international law that already applied in 
the territory where the conduct at issue occurred. For example, all of 
our U.S. criminal laws implementing universal jurisdiction under 
international law are legislatively enacted statutes—whether of the 
sort like the much-litigated 1819 act prohibiting piracy against the 
law of nations, which simply invokes the definition of the offense 
under ―the law of nations,‖27 or more recent laws like federal statutes 
against torture and terrorism, which replicate the elements of the 
offenses laid out in widely ratified international treaties or just 
incorporate the treaties by reference.
28
 
III. KIOBEL‘S APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY TO THE ATS   
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Kiobel is consistent with 
everything that has been said so far. The Court unambiguously 
explained that the ATS ―does not directly regulate conduct or afford 
relief. It instead allows federal courts to recognize certain causes of 
action based on sufficiently definite norms of international law.‖29 
Indeed the Court framed the relevant question under the ATS as 
―whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under 
 
27. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1651 (2006)). 
28. See Colangelo, supra note 11, at 186–98.   
29. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).  
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U.S. law to enforce a norm of international law.‖30 In short, the cause 
of action is a creature of U.S. law and the conduct-regulating norm 
comes from international law.  
A presumption against extraterritoriality makes no sense when it 
comes to conduct-regulating norms of international law, which by 
their nature apply everywhere. Because conduct-regulating norms of 
international law cover the globe, using them as the conduct-
regulating rules of decision under the ATS does not constitute an 
exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction. From the quotes 
above, the Court seems to have accepted this view.  
But here‘s the twist. The Court then went on to locate another 
creature of U.S. law to which the presumption against 
extraterritoriality could, and did, apply. And in this respect, the Court 
did something new and strange: it applied the presumption to the 
cause of action authorized by the ATS—traditionally a creature of 
forum law, or lex fori, under principles of both international and U.S. 
law.
31
 This is, in fact, the whole basis behind the traditional approach 
to conflict of laws under which the forum crafts causes of action to 
allow foreigners to sue under foreign laws.
32
 It may be true that, 
generally speaking, the forum will not create a cause of action if there 
is no cause of action under the law of the place of the tort.
33
 And for 
this point, the Court in Kiobel cited Justice Holmes‘ opinion in Cuba 
Railroad Co. v. Crosby.
34
 But at the very least, that would require 
some evaluation of whether the law of the place of the harm, or lex 
loci delicti, provides a cause of action for, among other things, harms 
like crimes against humanity, torture, and arbitrary arrest and 
detention.
35
 At most, we might even take Holmes‘ opinion in Crosby 
at its word. There, the Court explained that ―[U.S.] courts would 
assume a liability to exist if nothing to the contrary appeared‖ when 
dealing with torts that ―are likely to impose an obligation in all 
civilized countries.‖36 This language suggests that in such cases the 
 
30. Id. at 1666 (emphasis added).  
31. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 554, 557 (Little, 
Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1857) (1834). 
32. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384(1) (1934). 
33. Id. § 384(2).    
34. 222 U.S. 473 (1912).  
35. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (listing the violations of the law of nations alleged by 
the Kiobel plaintiffs). 
36. Crosby, 222 U.S. at 478. 
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burden would fall on the defendant to show no liability under the law 
of the place of the harm. And if nothing else, the concept of universal 
jurisdiction stands for the proposition that there are some acts that 
―impose an obligation in all civilized countries.‖37 
But that‘s not all. What makes Kiobel‘s extension of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS doubly strange is 
that the Court had just went out of its way to make clear that the 
presumption applies to exercises of prescriptive—as opposed to 
adjudicative—jurisdiction. In Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd.,
38
 the Court devoted an entire section of its opinion to clarify 
precisely this point.
39
 The question in Morrison was ―whether § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to 
foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for 
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign 
exchanges.‖40 This question, in turn, boiled down to whether and how 
a presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the Exchange 
Act.
41
  
According to the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit had, 
mistakenly, ―considered the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) to raise a 
question of subject-matter jurisdiction.‖42 To correct this ―threshold 
error,‖ the Court clarified the difference between prescriptive 
jurisdiction to regulate conduct on the one hand, and the ―quite 
separate‖ issue of the district court‘s adjudicative jurisdiction to 
entertain suit on the other.
43
 In Morrison, the presumption applied to 
the former but not the latter. To be sure, the Court explicitly observed 
that ―the District Court here had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
to adjudicate the question whether § 10(b) applies.‖44 The Court 
elaborated:  
Section 78aa provides: ‗The district courts of the 
United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and 
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
 
37. Id.  
38. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).  
39. See id. at 2876–77.  
40. Id. at 2875. 
41. Id. at 2877. 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. 
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created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and 
regulations thereunder.‘45  
Like § 78aa, the ATS is—as the Court in Kiobel openly 
acknowledged—―strictly jurisdictional.‖46 And like § 78aa, the ATS 
authorizes U.S. courts with ―jurisdiction.‖47 Under the ATS, that 
―jurisdiction‖ encompasses ―any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations.‖48 If the ATS does 
not sufficiently indicate extraterritorial application, certainly neither 
does § 78aa. And if the district court in Morrison ―had jurisdiction 
under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa‖ over claims involving extraterritorial 
activity—as the Supreme Court explicitly said it did49—then the 
district court in Kiobel also should have ―had jurisdiction under [the 
ATS]‖ over claims involving extraterritorial activity. Thus, the 
Court‘s decision in Kiobel contradicts not only longstanding 
principles of U.S. and international law, but also its own most recent 
precedent on the presumption against extraterritoriality and, in the 
process, renders that law incoherent.          
CONCLUSION  
Whether the applicable law in ATS suits involves the direct or 
indirect application of international law was always a red herring. 
Neither U.S. nor international law cares how international law is 
incorporated into a domestic rule of decision for prescriptive 
jurisdictional purposes. All that matters is that the conduct-regulating 
rule is the same: international substantive law, including as to 
liability. Accordingly, whether the conduct-regulating rule in ATS 
suits is conceptualized as the direct or indirect application of 
international law via U.S. common law does not matter. Instead, what 
really matters is whether the applicable conduct-regulating rule 
faithfully and accurately reflects extant international law, including 
as to liability. Only if it does, could the exercise of jurisdiction over 
entirely foreign activity have stood under prevailing canons of 
statutory construction before Kiobel. 
 
45. Id. at 2877 n.3. 
46. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). 
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
48. Id.  
49. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.  
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Kiobel recognized that international law is the applicable 
conduct-regulating rule under the ATS and acknowledged that a 
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply to conduct-
regulating rules under the statute.
50
 But the Court then extended a 
new presumption against extraterritoriality to the only part of the case 
left governed by U.S. law: the cause of action authorized by the 
ATS.
51
 This novel use of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
contradicts not only longstanding principles of U.S. and international 
law, but also the Court‘s own most recent opinion on the 
presumption, rendering the law contradictory and incoherent. Having 
decided, correctly in my view, that the conduct-regulating rule under 
the ATS comes from international law, the Court essentially painted 
itself into a corner. It wanted to apply the presumption, but had only a 
jurisdictional statute left to construe. The problem with construing the 
ATS in light of the presumption (apart from the fact that the ATS was 
enacted well before the presumption ever came into existence) is 
there was no U.S. conduct-regulating rule to which the presumption 
could apply and the Court had just found the presumption 
inapplicable to a jurisdictional statute in Morrison. I tend to agree 
with those who have suggested that the Court in Kiobel was likely 
making a merits-based, rather than a subject matter jurisdiction, 
determination. But why be so cagey about this point? Morrison 
certainly wasn‘t. Perhaps the reason is that Kiobel contradicts not 
only longstanding principles of U.S. and international law, but also 
the Court‘s own most recent precedent.  
 
50. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
51. See id. 
